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Abstract: Scholars of American civil religion (ACR) have paid insufficient attention to the micro-level
processes through which civil religious ideas have historically influenced beliefs and behavior.
We know little about what makes such appeals meaningful to average Americans (assuming they
are meaningful); nor do we know much about the mechanisms through which abstract religious
themes and imagery come to be associated with specific policy aims, or what Robert Bellah called
“national goals.” This article argues that a renewed focus on the relationship between civil religion
and organized religion can help fill this gap in the literature. More specifically, I draw attention to
three mainline Protestant institutions that for much of the twentieth-century were instrumental both
in cultivating respect for the national civic faith and in connecting its abstract ideals to concrete reform
programs: namely, the clergy, the state and local church councils, and the policy-oriented departments
of the National Council of Churches (NCC). Finally, I argue that a fresh look at the relationship
between civil religion and “church religion” sheds new light on the (arguably) diminished role of civil
religious appeals in the present. If, as Bellah claimed in his later writings, ACR appeals have lost much
of their power to motivate support for shared national goals, it is at least in part because the formal
religious networks through which they once were transmitted and interpreted have largely collapsed.
Keywords: civil religion; Robert Bellah; mainline Protestantism; civil rights
In the decades since the publication of Robert Bellah’s seminal early writings on the American
civil religion (ACR), scholarly discussions of the subject have focused almost entirely on identifying
and interrogating the abstract ideas that are said to comprise the core of our national civic faith.
Consequently, there is a rich body of literature describing how politicians and public intellectuals have
used religious or quasi-religious themes and concepts—e.g., national destiny, the covenant, collective
sin and redemption—to mobilize popular support for preferred policies. And there is an equally rich
body of literature questioning whether such appeals are really so influential, or whether their influence
on the course of American political development has been positive or negative. But for all that has
been written about the substance and merits of the American civil religion, scholars have had relatively
little to say about how ACR appeals operate at the micro level. We know little about what makes such
appeals meaningful to average Americans (assuming they are meaningful); nor do we know much
about the mechanisms through which the abstract ideas at the heart of the ACR are transmitted to
average citizens or connected to concrete policy goals (see e.g., Murphy 2011; Lienesch 2018).
In this article, I argue that a renewed focus on the relationship between civil religion and organized
religion can help fill this gap in the literature. While Bellah and other early students of American civil
religion tended to downplay the role of churches and other religious bodies in cultivating allegiance to
the ACR, we shall see that formal religious bodies have traditionally ranked among the most important
conduits for ACR appeals. From the turn of the twentieth century until the late 1960s, the national civic
faith derived much of its power from the fact that millions of Americans were embedded in organized
religious networks whose leaders not only made regular use of civil religious themes and ideas, but also
carried out the micro-level work of connecting these open-ended principles and concepts to specific
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reform programs. A fresh look at the relationship between civil religion and “church religion” may
also shed new light on the (arguably) diminished role of civil religious appeals in the present. If,
as Bellah claimed in his later writings, ACR appeals have lost much of their power to motivate support
for shared national goals, it is at least in part because the formal religious networks through which
they once were transmitted and interpreted have largely collapsed.
1. Civil Religion and Organized Religion: Understanding the Relationship
To be sure, Bellah and other early theorists of American civil religion were well aware that the United
States could not have developed a robust civic faith absent high rates of formal religious participation.
The ideas at the core of the ACR were, after all, religious ideas; if Americans overwhelmingly believed
in a deity who was active in world affairs, and who took a personal interest in the success or failure of
the American democratic experiment, it was at least in part because they regularly encountered these
ideas in their places of worship. And yet, the role afforded formal religious bodies in perpetuating the
ACR was typically quite limited, consisting mainly of buttressing average citizens’ belief in a higher
power who would one day judge the nations. Mobilizing citizens on behalf of concrete “national goals”
was generally described as a job for politicians, not ministers. As Bellah explained in his original
article, revered political leaders such as Abraham Lincoln had consistently provided “a higher level of
religious insight” into national problems than “the leaders of the churches” (Bellah 2005, p. 49).
Why did early civil religion scholars discount the churches’ role as practical interpreters of civil
religious ideas? The answer can be traced in part to the theory, first developed by Alexis de Tocqueville,
that America’s vibrant religious landscape was underpinned by a strict separation of church and state.
Having “shaken off the authority of the pope,” Tocqueville observed, the men and women who settled
“British America” had little tolerance for religious leaders who sought to exercise Earthly authority
(quoted in Bellah 2005, p. 50). Although American religion was from the outset greatly concerned with
the practical business of improving society, such efforts were usually “voluntary” in nature, and—at
least after the collapse of the New England religious establishments—rarely relied on the coercive
power of the state (Lipset 1963). As Bellah put the point, “Under the doctrine of religious liberty,
an exceptionally wide sphere of personal piety and voluntary social action was left to the churches.
But the churches were neither to control the state nor be controlled by it” (Bellah 2005, p. 46). Religious
leaders who violated their end of the bargain by attempting to seize the levers of official power risked
alienating their congregations, as well as potential converts. But so long as they confined their political
commentary to reaffirming the abstract tenets of republican government, the churches tended to remain
full (Mead 1974; Hammond 1976, p. 176).
A second reason why Bellah and others may have discounted the churches’ role in fleshing out the
substance of the American civil religion is that they saw little empirical evidence that religious elites
were capable of performing this task. Writing in the late 1960s and early 1970s, at a time when the
mainline Protestant churches were trying and failing to shape the national debates over Vietnam and
African American civil rights, it seemed clear that few American churchgoers deferred to their nominal
religious leaders on divisive political questions (Hadden 1969; also see Gill 2011). Nor was the “relative
impotence [of the churches] . . . in contemporary moral life” understood to be a recent development
(Hammond 1976, p. 176). In 1976, Bellah’s collaborator Phillip Hammond observed that American
religious leaders had sponsored “little in the way of national change since pietistic Protestants got
prohibition imposed” (Hammond 1976, p. 176). Add to this the ongoing sexual revolution, and it
appeared that the churches were rapidly losing whatever direct authority over the everyday lives
of their parishioners they had once possessed. Formal religious bodies that could no longer enforce
even the most basic standards of personal morality were unlikely to succeed in mobilizing support for
policies that ran counter to the interests or prejudices of their parishioners, or so the argument went
(Bellah 1975, p. 142).
It should be noted that Bellah, in his later works, did develop a greater appreciation for the role that
the nation’s churches had played in mobilizing public support for major political reforms, particularly
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during the nineteenth century. In The Broken Covenant, for example, he acknowledged that the “neutral
deistic language” of early American civil religion would have had little practical effect absent “a
burgeoning revivalism” that filled “[c]old external forms” with a “warm inner life” that “impressed
[itself] into the imaginative life of the [American] people.” It was “precisely this dynamic combination
of public form and private meaning” that, from the Second Great Awakening forward, endowed civil
religious appeals with the power to shape public opinion (Bellah 1975, p. 45; also see Bortolini 2012,
pp. 198–99). And yet, Bellah’s conception of what he called “church religion” remained, even in these
later essays, largely detached from actual churches. It was not the authority of particular clergymen or
denominational leaders that had compelled slavery opponents and other nineteenth-century Americans
to extraordinary acts of self-sacrifice on behalf of ambitious national goals. Rather, it was a kind of
free-floating evangelical revivalism—an “intense, immediate, and personal” force whose comings and
goings were more or less impossible to predict (Bellah 1975, p. 48).
More recently, a handful of scholars have begun to reassess the relationship between civil
religion and organized religion. Andrew Murphy, without explicitly mentioning formal religious
bodies, has rightly suggested that scholars pay greater attention to “the more localized and contested
ground-level” processes through which civil religious ideas are formulated, debated, and disseminated
(Murphy 2011, pp. 231, 233). Michael Lienesch, in an article examining the Protestant response to
World War I, has helpfully documented the “central role” of “religious institutions” both in developing
“a sacralized form of patriotic nationalism” and in critiquing the militaristic aims that have so
often motivated civil religious appeals. Lienesch rightly notes that “the relationships between civil
religion and more conventional forms of organized religion are often close and at time contentious,”
and that Protestant religious leaders have developed “a variety of . . . competing versions” of the
American civil religion, often in direct competition with one another (Lienesch 2018, pp. 93, 99).
Robert Putnam and David Campbell, in a work featuring careful case studies of several religious
congregations, have likewise drawn attention to the “civic role” of American churches, arguing that
religious engagement may simultaneously foster patriotic sentiments and toleration of diversity
(Putnam and Campbell, pp. 517–21). Other scholars, including Phillip Gorski and Raymond
Haberski, have documented the often bitter internal debates concerning civil religion that have
regularly consumed American religious communities, particularly during times of national crisis
(Gorski 2017; Haberski 2012).
These scholars deserve much credit for highlighting the contested nature of American civil
religion—and for pointing out that formal religious bodies, perhaps more than any other segment
of civil society, have helped shape the parameters of the debate. And yet, studies examining how
particular religious bodies have used civil religious appeals to mobilize support or opposition to specific
policy goals remain surprisingly rare. The paucity of work in this area is both curious and unfortunate,
since much of the civil religion debate—from 1967 to today—has centered on the empirical question of
whether civil religious appeals have in fact played a meaningful role in American political development.
Bellah, for his part, was insistent that the ACR had frequently been instrumental in shaping national
policy, and that its impact was felt most keenly in campaigns to advance landmark egalitarian reforms,
such as the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society (Bellah 2005, pp. 46, 51). Many of
Bellah’s critics, in contrast, saw little evidence that civil religious appeals had succeeded in shaping
average citizens’ thinking concerning important policy questions; others objected that the American
civil religion’s core signs, symbols, and ideas were so amorphous that they could be used to justify
almost any imaginable political program—in which case the concept was of equally little use in
explaining the evolution of national policy (e.g., Porterfield 1994).
In what follows, I argue that Bellah was both right and wrong—right to believe that civil religious
appeals had been instrumental in advancing egalitarian policy aims, but wrong to discount the role of
Protestant, Jewish, and Catholic elites and institutions in connecting abstract civil religious appeals to
concrete policy programs. At the elite level, it is clear that leaders of all three faiths, often working
in tandem, helped cultivate respect for the substantive values, such as racial equality and religious
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toleration, that Bellah linked to the ACR (see e.g., Wall 2008; Schultz 2011). My primary focus here,
however, will be on the institutional infrastructure of mainline Protestantism. This decision reflects
the fact that mainline Protestants were for much of the twentieth century the nation’s largest faith
community, meaning mainline elites were particularly well positioned to shape public opinion on the
pressing issues of the day. Moreover, by focusing on a single faith, we can gain greater insight into the
processes through which average believers were encouraged to view specific reforms as consistent
with the core ideals of the ACR. Below, I highlight three mainline Protestant institutions that were
particularly effective at using religious themes and imagery to build support for egalitarian reforms:
the clergy, the state and local church councils, and the policy-oriented departments of the National
Council of Churches (NCC).
2. The Mainline Protestant Clergy
During the early years of the twentieth century, the nation’s largest “mainline” Protestant
denominations—including the Methodists, Northern Baptists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians,
and Congregationalists—coalesced around an ambitious and remarkably concrete program of social
reform that centered on improving the lives of industrial workers and other marginalized citizens.
Initially, the churches focused most of their social activism on labor relations and working conditions,
as when delegates to the inaugural meeting of the Federal Council of Churches (FCC) adopted a
“Social Creed” calling for a living wage, shorter working hours, and new regulations to protect women,
children, and other vulnerable classes of workers (Sanford 1909, pp. 238–39; Dorrien 2009, pp. 111–12).
During the 1920s and 1930s, the mainline social vision expanded to include issues of racial, ethnic,
and religious diversity. Partly in response to the growth of nativist organizations like the Ku Klux
Klan, the mainline churches launched new programs to educate white churchgoers about the evils
of lynching and segregation, as well as several interfaith initiatives that aimed to bring Protestants
into closer communion with their Jewish and Catholic neighbors (MacFarland 1948, pp. 209, 217;
Federal Council of Churches 1923; Kaufmann 2004; Wall 2008; Schultz 2011). Following World War II,
the mainline churches added other policy goals to their agendas, including promoting international
cooperation, arms control efforts, and similar initiatives that seemed likely to ease Cold War tensions
(King 1989; Preston 2012).
Like the political leaders who were the focus of Bellah’s writings on civil religion, mainline church
officials routinely couched their policy appeals in the signs and symbols of the ACR, arguing that the
nation was party to a divine covenant, and that its religious leaders had been tasked with the “prophetic”
responsibility of alerting citizens to collective sins—from lynching to child labor—that threatened
to undermine America’s witness to the wider world (Findlay 1993; Miller 1958, pp. 217–18). At the
same time, Protestant leaders knew that formal pronouncements, by themselves, rarely succeeded in
convincing large numbers of churchgoers to support major social or political reforms. To shape public
opinion, they knew, it would be necessary to embed their egalitarian social vision in the institutions
that structured the religious lives of individual believers and congregations.
At the congregational level, the most important source of ethical instruction was, of course,
the local minister. Denominational leaders therefore took great care to ensure that seminary-trained
ministers—who comprised the bulk of the mainline clergy—were well versed in the social ideals
of their parent denominations. Beginning around the turn of the century, church officials added
social ethics courses to the standard seminary curriculum, churning out a new crop of ministers who
believed that efforts to improve working conditions and protect vulnerable laborers represented a
critical step in the coming of the Kingdom (Dorrien 2009, pp. 6–51). Several prestigious seminaries and
divinity schools—Union Theological Seminary, the University of Chicago, the Episcopal Theological
School—went so far as to require students to work several hours per week at local settlement houses or
missions with the aim of highlighting the ways in which poverty and exploitative labor practices worked
to undermine the churches’ evangelistic mission (Abell 1962, p. 231). Significantly, most such programs
survived the theological battles of the 1920s; even as seminary faculties divided into competing camps
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of modernists and fundamentalists, most retained their commitment to educating ministers in the
practical business of social reform (Miller 2007, p. 162).
In the 1930s, rudimentary public opinion studies revealed that the vast majority of mainline
clergymen remained committed to the ideals of their seminary days after they accepted pastorates.
In 1935, for example, the Roosevelt administration wrote to more than 120,000 clergymen, asking for
their views on Social Security, the public works program, and other New Deal initiatives. Remarkably,
more than 30,000 of the recipients responded, the vast majority expressing strong support for the
administration’s domestic program (Billington and Clark 1986). More to the point, many of these
letters characterized core New Deal initiatives, such as old-age pensions and unemployment insurance,
as divinely inspired programs that promised to fulfill the nation’s covenantal obligations toward its
marginalized citizens. A Presbyterian clergyman wrote that the Social Security Act was “in line with
the social progress of Christianity and the Christian Church,” reminding FDR that “[t]he church . . . is
always ready to cooperate to the utmost of its ability . . . to better the material and spiritual conditions
and life of the American people” (Dewar 1935). A Methodist pastor likewise judged the “Social Security
Measure . . . one of, if not the greatest statutes . . . any Government has ever produced. It carries out
the gist of the Social Creed of the Churches of America, some things the Christian organizations of the
world have urged and stood [for] through the centuries” (Martin 1935). Other ministers employed
imagery from Exodus, with Roosevelt standing in for Moses, and the United States for Israel. God had
chosen FDR to lead the nation through this “trying hour,” wrote a small-town Illinois pastor, and “I
sincerely trust that the ‘Burning Bush’ that fired Moses, will rekindle in you a new passion for leading
a hungry-souled people to a new Canaan” (Hayden 1935; also see Isetti 1996).
The Roosevelt administration’s 1935 survey was, of course, a highly unscientific endeavor,
and many skeptics alleged that administration critics, viewing the President’s letter as a political stunt,
had not bothered to respond, thereby skewing the results. But in the late 1940s, more sophisticated
opinion polls demonstrated that the apparent outpouring of clergy support for the New Deal was
likely not an artifact of sampling bias. In 1949, for example, the Princeton-based Opinion Research
Corporation asked 1500 randomly selected Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish clergymen a battery of
questions concerning the ethics of capitalism, the state of labor relations, and whether corporations
and business leaders were meeting their ethical obligations to the community. The poll’s most
important finding was that most clergymen adopted a prophetic view of economic questions, believing
it their role to criticize corporations that failed to provide citizens with “good working conditions,
fair and just wages . . . and honest products.” Although Jewish and Catholic clergymen were the
most consistently critical of the “American business system,” most Protestant ministers—or at least
solid pluralities—agreed that the nation’s corporations were falling short of the mark. For example,
58 percent of Protestant respondents agreed that there was an “inherent conflict between business
as it exists in this country and Christian . . . ideals and principles” (compared to 36 percent who
disagreed); 45 percent believed there was “little economic justice in the way our business system
distributes wealth” (compared to 39 percent who disagreed with the statement); and 53 percent agreed
that American corporations were guilty of wasting natural resources (compared to 37 percent who
disagreed) (Opinion Research Corporation 1949).
How often did such convictions find their way into Sunday morning sermons? Although there is
no way to answer this question with any degree of precision, such evidence as exists suggests that most
ministers viewed the inculcation of socio-ethical ideals as an important part of their job descriptions.
While endorsements of particular candidates or parties were rare (and potentially problematic under
the tax code), endorsements of broader ideals, such as economic stewardship and racial equality,
were apparently common. The 1949 clergy survey, conducted at a time of intense popular concern
about the state of the postwar economy, found that 58 percent of Protestant ministers had recently
addressed “business or economic problems” in their sermons (Opinion Research Corporation 1949).
Fifteen years later, as the push for the 1964 Civil Rights Act reached its climax, more than two out of
three (69 percent) of Northern white Protestants who belonged to a church reported that “problems
Religions 2019, 10, 350 6 of 17
of race relations” had been discussed at their places of worship. And of those who had encountered
civil rights-related messages, a remarkable 91 percent reported that their “minister[s]” believed that
“religion or the Bible favor[s] . . . integration” (American National Election Studies 1964; see also
Compton Forthcoming).
If parish clergymen were generally supportive of the ideals articulated in the 1908 Social
Creed, campus clergymen were even more enthusiastic. Born in the years around 1900, the modern
campus ministry took shape when church leaders awoke to the fact that mandatory religious training
had largely disappeared from the standard curriculum at top-tier universities. Convinced that
impressionable young men (and later women) should not be left to their own devices in matters of faith,
most Protestant-affiliated private universities created a chaplain’s office, whose functions included
counseling students, advising religious student groups, and coordinating optional religious services
and educational programming. At public universities the same functions were typically performed by
campus ministers hired by the mainline denominations themselves, who operated out of churches
or offices within easy walking distance of the campus. Significantly, the number of chaplains and
campus ministers exploded in the immediate aftermath of World War II—more than doubling in the
case of chaplains—as the mainline churches, suddenly flush with cash, assumed the responsibility
of ministering to the hundreds of thousands of G.I. Bill-funded students who were inundating the
nation’s campuses (Hammond 1966, pp. 4–5).
The number of Americans influenced by campus clergymen was, of course, small relative to
the number reached by parish clergymen. But the presence in large numbers of idealistic ministers
on the nation’s college campuses nonetheless ensured that upwardly mobile men—and eventually
women—would be encouraged to view contemporary social problems in light of the social teachings of
their respective denominations. In many cases, campus clergymen were explicitly instructed to focus
their efforts on social ethics. Methodist guidelines advised campus ministers to bear “prophetic witness”
to the nation’s students, and to “foster a Christian community” that would prepare students to confront
injustice in the wider world (Hammond 1966, pp. 43–44). Surveys of campus clergymen indicated
that most eagerly embraced the assignment. Researchers noted, for example, that university ministers
were significantly more liberal in their views on race relations, economic inequality, and foreign
policy than parish ministers.1 It was perhaps only natural, then, that campus ministers’ offices and
student ecumenical groups such as the campus “Y’s” became organizing hubs for students who felt
called to protest against racial discrimination or other social injustices (Hammond 1966, pp. 10–11;
Rossinow 1998, pp. 93–133; Heineman 1993, p. 88).
Not surprisingly, mid-century conservatives regularly groused about the liberal bias of the
mainline Protestant clergy. Many went so far as to claim, rather implausibly, that the nation’s ministers
were single-handedly blocking efforts to roll back the social welfare and labor reforms of the 1930s and
1940s. This was the view of the wealthy conservative activist J. Howard Pew, and also of officials at the
National Association of Manufacturers (NAM); and during the 1950s, both Pew and NAM poured
hundreds of thousands of dollars into programs designed to cure Protestant clergymen of their social
democratic tendencies (Fones-Wolf 1994; Kruse 2015; Grem 2016). Such clergy “education” initiatives
received tacit—and in some cases explicit—support from right-leaning celebrity ministers like Billy
Graham and Norman Vincent Peale. And yet, at least initially, they bore surprisingly little fruit. Indeed,
most of the organizations founded for the purpose of alerting clergymen to the evils of the social
welfare state—for example, Spiritual Mobilization and the Christian Freedom Foundation—struggled
to gain even a few hundred dues-paying members. Moreover, through the end of the 1950s, polls
commissioned by Pew and other conservative activists found that their efforts had produced little
change in the social and political views of average clergymen. Far from turning against the welfare
1 An early 1960s survey of 1000 campus ministers found that 53 percent judged their own denominations “too conservative in
the field of social action” (as compared to 17 percent of parish ministers) (Hammond 1966, p. 43).
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state, most ministers continued to view it as a divinely-sanctioned step toward the creation of a more
just society (Compton Forthcoming).
3. The Church Council Network
During the early twentieth century, mainline Protestant elites strongly encouraged the formation
of state and local councils of churches—intermediate bodies that, while fully under the control of local
clergymen and lay leaders, were intended to provide national religious leaders with an organic link
to the men and women in the pews. Although local councils (or federations) of churches were not
unheard of in the nineteenth century, the idea grew in popularity after the Federal Council of Churches
(FCC)—the major umbrella group for the mainline Protestant denominations—began promoting it
in the 1910s. By the late 1920s, local councils staffed by paid professionals were operating in at least
49 cities, while volunteer councils were operating in hundreds of smaller communities. The largest
local councils, such as those in New York and Chicago, employed ten or more full-time staff members
and controlled annual budgets of as much as $100,000 (in 1920s dollars) (Douglass 1930, pp. 51, 229).2
And although not all Protestant churches participated in state or local councils—efforts to incorporate
black churches were half-hearted at best—contemporaneous studies found that participation rates
in Northeastern and Midwestern cities were often above 50 percent, and in some cases as high as
90 percent.3 (White Protestants in the Southern and Border states, who strongly objected to the FCC’s
liberal positions on racial issues, mostly shunned the federation movement).
Many of the functions performed by local church councils were purely ecclesiastical
in nature—tasks such as conducting community surveys, training Sunday School teachers,
and coordinating the location of new churches. Arguably their most important function, however,
was to serve as a mouthpiece for Protestant clergymen and lay leaders who wished to express their
views on issues of public concern. A study of 29 local councils conducted in the late 1920s found
that 86 percent had recently “agitated for reform on specific issues,” and more than two-thirds had
formally endorsed or opposed a particular piece of legislation. In cities such as Detroit, Pittsburgh,
and Chicago, as much as fifty percent of the local council’s communication with member churches
concerned public affairs; popular subjects included Sabbath observance, drinking, and gambling,
but systemic questions of economic justice and race relations also occupied a prominent place on
the agendas of these and other councils (Douglass 1930, pp. 379, 372). Significantly, local councils
soon proved themselves capable of mobilizing large numbers of churchgoers on behalf of specific
causes. In 1928, for example, Massachusetts Senator David Walsh estimated that a state federation of
churches letter-writing campaign on behalf of the Kellogg–Briand Pact was responsible for one-third
of all the mail received by his office; in Michigan, a similar campaign sponsored by the Detroit
Federation of Churches convinced more than 1000 congregations to petition their representatives
(Douglass 1930, p. 390).
Another function of the local church council was to serve as a conduit for educational and other
materials generated at FCC headquarters. In a typical year, FCC department heads bombarded their
local counterparts with dozens of communiqués, many of which touched on such sensitive issues as race
relations, industrial reform, and war and peace.4 Realizing that the church council network offered an
invaluable link to the hinterlands, FCC officials relied on it both to educate average churchgoers about
favored reforms, and also to encourage popular demonstrations of support. During the Depression
2 Douglass (1930) reports that the median federation budget was $11,000, and that fully one-fourth of federations had annual
budgets of $30,000 or more.
3 Douglass (1930, p. 95; 1924, p. 174) reports the participation rates in some representative cities as follows: Chicago
(43 percent), Detroit (52 percent), Pittsburgh (54 percent), St. Louis (90 percent).
4 As Sanderson (1960, p. 143) points out, most local councils modeled their organizational structures on the Federal Council,
so that both national and local bodies featured departments dedicated to comity, evangelism, social service, religious
education, and the like. For obvious reasons, this arrangement fostered cooperation between state, local, and national
officials working on similar issues.
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years, for example, the FCC department heads kept state and local council leaders well supplied
with educational materials that painted such Roosevelt administration initiatives as unemployment
insurance, the National Recovery Administration (NRA) industrial codes, and the workers’ rights
provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in a highly favorable light. Believing that such
programs were in keeping with the longstanding social ideals of the mainline churches, FCC officials
urged state and local religious leaders to participate in a “program of moral and spiritual strengthening”
designed to ensure that the “superstructure” of the nation’s new economic order would “rest not upon
the sand but upon the rock” (McKee 1954, p. 175). In response, many local councils took the initiative
to organize events, such as industrial conferences and local educational sessions, that aimed to educate
average Americans about the administration’s efforts to assist unemployed workers and revive the
nation’s moribund economy (Compton Forthcoming).
The true heyday of the state and local church council network did not arrive until the post-World
War II period, however. Finding themselves suddenly inundated with new members and flush
with cash, the mainline Protestant churches poured money into ecumenical projects, and the number
of state and local church councils exploded. Between the late 1930s and mid-1950s, the number of
professionally staffed church councils grew from a few dozen to a little over two hundred; by the
mid-1960s, that figure would grow to nearly 300 (Landis 1965). Payrolls expanded as well; by 1959,
the nation’s local church councils employed around 700 people and commanded annual budgets in
excess of $13 million ($113 million in 2019 dollars) (Sanderson 1960, pp. 205–11). In rural areas where
people and resources were scarce, Protestant church councils staffed by volunteers became increasingly
common; by the early 1960s, the National Council of Churches—the successor to the FCC—had contact
information for 650 of them (Landis 1963).
Buoyed by this infusion of resources, church councils in the Northeastern and Midwestern states
pursued a robust program of social activism. In the immediate postwar period, the major focus was
promoting peace and international cooperation. This meant, among other things, building support
for the fledgling United Nations, directing aid to war torn European nations, and supporting arms
control and other initiatives that seemed likely to ratchet down Cold War tensions. Perhaps the most
popular manifestation of pro-UN sentiment took place on Halloween, when hundreds of thousands of
Sunday School children, typically at the behest of local church councils, carried small orange boxes
in which they collected donations for United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund’s
(UNICEF) efforts to feed and clothe children in foreign lands (Massachusetts Council of Churches 1956,
p. E23; Indiana Council of Churches 1960, p. 2; Council of Churches of Buffalo and Erie County 1957).5
For older children, local church councils sponsored “Know Your United Nations” essay contests, as
well as frequent trips to church youth seminars at the U.N. Headquarters in New York. In hundreds of
American communities, including such out-of-the-way places as Terre Haute, Indiana, church councils
not only observed a “United Nations Sunday” (during which ministers were urged to incorporate
material on the U.N. into their sermons) but also took the lead in organizing community-wide “U.N.
Week” events at schools and other secular venues (Compton Forthcoming). With few exceptions, these
and other efforts at promoting a more peaceful world were framed as efforts to fulfill the nation’s
God-given destiny. As the leaders of the Albany Federation of Churches wrote in publicity materials
for a 1948 “Pray for Peace” initiative—which included weekly prayer services, twice-daily radio
broadcasts, and weekly newspaper advertisements—God had called Americans to labor “together in
the Kingdom’s work,” putting their “trust in God’s leadership” and “keep[ing] ever before [them] a
vision of a better world” (Federation of Churches of Albany and Vicinity 1948, pp. 1–2).
In the mid-1950s, following the Supreme Court’s landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision,
many Northern church councils shifted their focus to civil rights, urging support for school integration
5 In most cities, the program was spearheaded by the local council of churches or the United Church Women. Typically, a wide
range of civic and religious groups—including the Girl and Boy Scouts, as well as Jewish and Catholic groups—joined
together to form a coordinating committee.
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and fair housing laws, the repeal of anti-miscegenation laws, and a variety of other reforms. Like the
foreign policy campaigns of the late 1940s and early 1950s, pro-civil rights appeals were regularly framed
as efforts to fulfill the nation’s providential mission, or else to remedy injustices that violated the nation’s
covenantal commitments, and for which all white Americans shared some blame. The Cleveland
Area Church Federation, which was particularly active in promoting fair housing laws, made its
views known through a full-page newspaper advertisement headlined “He Died for All.” By directing
readers’ attention to Christ’s sacrifice on the cross, the ads sought to remind churchgoers that racial
segregation, which violated the Christian principle of the equal “dignity of man,” was a collective sin
that required immediate remedial action. God had called Americans not only to avoid overt acts of
racism in their personal lives, but also to work together to promote the “genuine and full participation”
in civic life of all citizens (Cleveland Area Church Federation 1963).
The theme of providential duty was at the heart of the local church councils’ critical efforts in
support of what became the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In this case, local council officials followed
the lead of the National Council of Churches’ Commission on Religion and Race (CORR), a hastily
formed body that was tasked with coordinating the Protestant churches’ pro-civil rights lobbying
efforts. From the group’s inception, the leaders of CORR saw their principal mission as convincing
average churchgoers that existing forms of racial inequality constituted “blasphemy against God,”
and a denial of the nation’s founding promise to recognize the equal “worth which God has given to all
citizens” (Blake 1963). They soon found a ready partner in the nation’s state and local church councils.
As early as 1963, participants in the annual meeting of the Association of Council Secretaries—the major
professional group for local church council employees—pledged to “cooperate fully” with the Kennedy
administration’s attempts to steer a meaningful civil rights bill through Congress (Association of
Council Secretaries 1963). Working closely with CORR, local council officials orchestrated a concerted
campaign to pressure the handful of Midwestern Senators and Representatives who were believed to
hold the balance of power in the congressional debate over civil rights. Officials in Colorado, Illinois,
Minnesota, Nebraska, and Ohio organized statewide “legislative conferences” that brought together
clergymen, church officials, and lay leaders to discuss the specifics of the President’s bill, as well as
the theological basis for church involvement. Church officials also took their message directly to the
men and women in the pews, arranging for educational teams composed of clergymen, theologians,
representatives of the major African-American civil rights groups, and legislative experts to fan out
across Nebraska, Indiana, Iowa, South Dakota, Illinois, and Ohio (Compton Forthcoming; see also
Findlay 1993, pp. 48–54; Hedgeman 1977, pp. 97–100).
Perhaps the local councils’ most important contribution to the civil rights push, however, was
to help organize massive letter-writing campaigns during critical junctures in the Civil Rights Act’s
perilous journey through the House and Senate. When the draft version of the civil rights bill stalled
in the House Judiciary Committee, and again when it appeared to be at risk of being defeated by
a Southern filibuster, the NCC’s Robert Spike urged local council officials to inundate members of
Congress with a wave of pro-civil rights mail. Spike also provided local council leaders with a
list of practical suggestions that included stocking church pews with paper, envelopes, and pencils
to facilitate letter-writing; having churches pay the cost of postage for letters to local members of
Congress; collecting letters in the offering plate; and ensuring that commemorative activities were
thoroughly covered by “local news media—press, radio, and television” (Spike 1963). His appeals
had the desired effect, as pro-civil rights letters poured into Congress from congregations, church civil
rights committees, and local Protestant councils. In the judgment of many seasoned congressional
correspondents, the letter-writing campaign on behalf of the civil rights bill dwarfed previous efforts
in this vein (Evans and Novak 1964). As one beleaguered Midwestern Senator informed a Wall Street
Journal reporter, his office had been inundated with pro-civil rights mail, and most of the “letterheads
[seemed to] indicate a church-inspired campaign” (Landauer 1963; also see Findlay 1993, p. 57).
In the end, it was the solid support of Midwestern Republicans in both the House and the Senate
that assured the 1964 Civil Rights Act’s passage (Findlay 1993, p. 54). Because most of the pivotal
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votes came from members representing predominately white and rural districts, most contemporary
observers credited (or else blamed) mainline Protestant church officials for mobilizing Midwestern
support for the bill. The syndicated columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak observed that
“[n]ot since Prohibition” had the nation’s clergymen “influenced political action in Congress” as
they were “now doing on behalf of President Johnson’s civil rights bill” (Evans and Novak 1964).
Although few pundits directly referenced the work of the local church councils, CORR officials readily
acknowledged that the councils had provided the critical communications network that had allowed
them to mobilize large numbers of churchgoers in far flung areas of the country, and often on short
notice (Hedgeman 1977, pp. 99–100).
4. The National Council of Churches (NCC)
Today, to the extent that it is remembered at all, the National Council of Churches (NCC) is
often described as an elite-dominated, top-heavy body whose left-leaning pronouncements mostly
escaped the notice of average churchgoers. In reality, the organization was designed to be, and for a
time actually functioned as, a deliberative forum in which church officials and lay leaders debated
current policy dilemmas in the light of Protestant ethical ideals. Because its myriad committees and
departments drew members from across the denominational and professional spectrum, the NCC was
able, at least during the 1950s and early 1960s, to present itself as the voice of American Protestantism
writ large. More than any other national ecumenical body, it succeeded in framing national policy
debates over civil rights and economic redistribution as religious tests for the nation: to take the side of
marginalized groups and citizens was to further America’s providential mission; to defend the status
quo was to violate the nation’s special covenant.
Launched with great fanfare in 1950, the NCC was the product of a merger between the Federal
Council of Churches (FCC) and eleven small Protestant denominations that had previously remained
aloof from ecumenical activities. The name change—from Federal Council to National Council—was
part of a larger rebranding effort. In short, the NCC’s founders envisioned an ecumenical organization
that would carry on most of the FCC’s major programs while shedding its left-of-center reputation.
The FCC’s staff and organizational structure were carried over largely intact, though some departments
were renamed, probably in the hope of rendering them less offensive to potential donors. Although the
changes were largely cosmetic, the makeover proved a smashing success. During the 1950s, President
Eisenhower and prominent members of his cabinet, such as John Foster Dulles, regularly addressed
Council gatherings, often sprinkling their speeches with allusions to the national civic faith. In October
1958, Eisenhower himself laid the cornerstone of the NCC’s sparkling new headquarters at the Interfaith
Center in Morningside Heights (Findlay 1993, pp. 11–12). The President’s speech, delivered before
an audience of 30,000, invoked George Washington’s conviction that “national morality [can] not be
maintained without religious principle.” In the United States, Eisenhower declared, “our churches
have always been sturdy defenders of the . . . God-given rights of each citizen. They have sought
to protect, to broaden and to sustain the historic laws of justice and truth and honor which are the
foundations of our community life. May they always do so” (Kihss 1958).
The National Council’s deliberative mission was centered in a series of departments whose
members pledged to apply Protestant ethical principles to contemporary problems. Some departments
were dedicated to purely religious subjects such as evangelism and religious broadcasting, but many
were focused on concrete social problems like racism and poverty. In both cases, a small professional
staff of council employees performed administrative duties, while the dozens of clergymen and lay
leaders who comprised its membership (and who typically met three to four times per year) ultimately
set the agenda.
The heads of policy-oriented departments were particularly focused on recruiting a professionally
diverse membership—the better to present their edicts as the considered judgments of the nation’s
churchgoing population. The Department of the Church and Economic Life (DCEL), which addressed
the religious aspects of modern economic problems, featured 125 members, including several prominent
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executives, a roughly equal number of labor officials, as well as representatives from agriculture,
academia, and the clergy. In terms of politics, the typical DCEL member was a moderate Republican,
and several were close advisors of President Eisenhower. Early recruits from the business community
included Studebaker’s Paul G. Hoffman, J. Irwin Miller of the Cummins Engine Company, Chester I.
Barnard of New Jersey Bell, W. Howard Chase of General Foods, Robert E. Wilson of Standard Oil,
and W. Walter Williams of Continental Mortgage (Poethig 1994; Compton Forthcoming). Yet the group
also included several active members whose views fell well to the left of the mainstream. One was Jerry
Voorhis, the former California Congressman who, after losing his seat to a redbaiting Richard Nixon
in 1946, became a leading figure in the cooperative movement. The Reuther brothers—Walter and
Victor—who served as president and educational director, respectively, of the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO), also were members. Looking back on his time with the DCEL, Voorhis was
most impressed by the fact that the group’s members were able to set aside partisan differences and
develop a “deep respect for one another around our common commitment to the Christian gospel.”
He had developed close friendships with several of the DCEL’s conservative business leaders, he told
an interviewer in the late 1970s, “despite the fact that we were always on opposite sides of the fence
politically” and locked horns “in almost every meeting” (Voorhis 1976).
During the 1950s, most DCEL members, including those who hailed from the corporate world,
viewed the group’s central mission as defending the New Deal-era welfare state from critics on both
the right and the left. In 1952, for example, the DCEL oversaw the publication by Harper and Brothers
of Goals of Economic Life, an edited volume featuring contributions from some of the nation’s leading
economists, sociologists, and theologians.6 Echoing the argument of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.’s
The Vital Center (Schlesinger 1949), the book’s major theme was that the economic middle ground
between Communism and laissez-faire offered the surest foundation for liberal democracy. Wealthy
individuals and corporations were essential to the nation’s economic wellbeing, but as trustees of
God-given resources they were ethically obligated to contribute to programs, like Social Security and
unemployment insurance, that eased the burdens of their less fortunate neighbors. Five additional
volumes on the relationship between God and Mammon followed, each one offering a variation on a
common theme: that Americans experiencing the “flush of a prosperity such as this nation has never
experienced” should not be lulled into “smug complacence,” but should instead contemplate how the
nation’s unprecedented material abundance might be used to further the purposes of the Almighty
(Childs and Cater 1954, “Foreword,” n.p.).
Prominent DCEL members including Cummins Engine’s Miller and Studebaker’s Hoffman
developed this theme in their frequent speeches to church groups. In a 1952 speech to a Denver church
gathering, Miller explained that the DCEL’s ultimate aim was to cure American society of its “tragic”
tendency to “recognize Christ’s role in individual life” while simultaneously promoting “irresponsible
selfishness in its public and group life.” This meant, among other things, awakening “the middle
class and the well-to-do” to the struggles of the working class. It meant making a case for “wages
justly determined, for a concept of work that is dignified and rewarding, and [providing workers
with] the voice in industry that Christian principles and democratic tradition demand” (Miller 1953).
Hoffman, who regularly addressed church groups, likewise couched his message in the language of
“duty” and “responsibility.” His point in stressing individual responsibility, however, was not to cast
aspersions on the welfare state, but rather to highlight citizens’ duties towards their neighbors—duties
that were all the more important now that the nation found itself locked in an ideological struggle
with the Soviet Union. The very survival of free society, he told the Los Angeles Council of Church
Women in 1951, depended on the cultivation of an “enlightened self-interest—a self-interest attuned
6 (Ward 1953) The book’s table of contents was packed with intellectual heavyweights, including the economists John Maurice
Clark, Frank Knight, Kenneth Boulding, Eduard Heimann, and William Vickrey; the theologians John C. Bennett and
Reinhold Niebuhr; the sociologist Robert Morrison MacIver; and the noted law professor Walton Hamilton.
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to the times we are living in and not the kind of self-interest that would . . . wither on its outmoded
prejudices” (Hoffman 1951).
Another NCC subunit that worked to connect abstract religious principles to concrete policy
reforms was the Department of Racial and Cultural Relations (DRCR). During the 1950s and early
1960s, under the leadership of J. Oscar Lee, an African-American minister and scholar, the Department
regularly issued pronouncements that cautiously advocated racial integration, while also organizing
annual interracial “institutes” that brought together white and black church leaders to discuss proposals
for combating the effects of discrimination in American life (Findlay 1993, pp. 28–29). In addition,
every February, Lee secured airtime on around 200 radio stations and a few dozen television stations
for a brief “Race Relations Sunday” message that expressed the Council’s views on the state of race
relations in the United States. In 1954, the message aired in every state except West Virginia, though
the vast majority of participating stations were located in the Midwest, Northeast, and West Coast.
Not surprisingly, few Southern station managers participated in the program (Lee 1954).
No less than the DCEL, Lee’s Department regularly clothed its appeals in the familiar signs and
symbols of the American civil religion, calling on white Americans to fulfill the nation’s destiny of
guaranteeing full equality for all its citizens. In 1957, for example, Lee recruited Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr. to compose the Race Relations Sunday message. King, who had recently become a household name
thanks to his leading role in the Montgomery Bus Boycott, used the opportunity to present northern
white churchgoers with a stark moral choice: Would they continue to indirectly aid the segregationists
by preaching patience and compromise, or would they instead “embrace the eternal demands of the
Almighty God” and call for the immediate “fulfillment of Christian principle[s]”? (National Council of
Churches 1957). Even when the Race Relations Sunday message was in the hands of less gifted orators,
the core message remained largely unchanged, and it grew progressively more uncompromising over
the course of the decade. NCC President Edwin Dahlberg’s 1959 message, for example, began by
quoting from the prophet Micah: “ . . . what does the Lord require of you but to do justice, and to love
kindness, and to walk humbly with your God?” Dahlberg then offered up a full-throated jeremiad,
warning that the “shadows of injustice are falling more and more ominously across the landscape
of our national life.” The time had come to heed the prophet’s message—as well as the Supreme
Court’s recent anti-segregation decisions—and begin integrating the spheres of “housing, education,
recreation, industry, and religion.” Failure to do so would discredit the nation’s “witness for Christ in
the non-Christian world”; repentance and reform, on the other hand, would allow the nation to once
again “walk humbly with God and enter into His kingdom” (National Council of Churches 1959).
When internal deliberations yielded a clear consensus, policy-oriented departments like the DCEL
and the DRCR forwarded draft pronouncements to the NCC’s General Board, a 270-person body
of clergymen and lay people that issued statements on behalf of the entire Council. Between 1952
and 1970, the Board approved roughly fifty policy pronouncements; topics ranged from federal aid
to education, to arms control, to collective bargaining, to unemployment, to immigration reform,
to legislative malapportionment and civil rights (Kelley 1971). The General Assembly, a much larger
body composed of delegates elected from the Council’s member churches, also enjoyed the authority
to adopt resolutions that put the Council on record in support of—or opposition to—specific polices
(though this body met only once every three years). Whether adopted by the Board or the Assembly,
the resulting edicts were typically peppered with biblical references and—more to the point—allusions
to the American civil religion. Echoing John Winthrop, the Assembly’s February 1964 resolution in
support of the pending civil rights bill warned that “[t]he eyes of the world are upon the American
Congress, watching to see whether our national legislative body . . . can meet the challenge of one of
the greatest moral issues of our time.” Failure to pass the civil rights bill in a timely manner would
“undermine . . . the confidence of all men who love liberty in the ability of the United States to advance
the global struggle for freedom” (“Calls Civil Rights Moral Issue”: NCC Resolution Challenges
Congress to Vote for Civil Rights 1964).
Religions 2019, 10, 350 13 of 17
The General Board’s edicts did not go unnoticed. Through the end of the 1960s, major newspapers
often devoted significant space to summarizing them, no doubt reasoning that they were of great
interest to the millions of Americans who belonged to Council-affiliated churches. During some
years in the early 1960s, the New York Times ran as many as twenty front-page stories on Council
pronouncements or policy deliberations, often reprinting pronouncements in full in its back pages
(Compton Forthcoming; “Churches Council Sets Social Code” 1954; ‘Norms’ Adopted to Guide
Christians 1954). In addition to newspaper coverage, the NCC’s media presence was amplified by
federal regulations that incentivized broadcasters to offer blocks of air time, free of charge, to religious
broadcasters. At the national level, the NCC soon became the de facto regulator of Protestant religious
programming, and it ensured that popular radio programs such as “Frontiers of Faith”—broadcast
nationally over the NBC television network—were moderated by liberal church officials who made no
secret of their belief that Christians were obligated to combat social injustice wherever they encountered
it (Compton Forthcoming).
5. Conclusions: How the Covenant Was Broken
It is probably not a coincidence that Bellah’s initial essay on civil religion appeared in the
immediate aftermath of the successful campaigns for the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting
Rights Act—campaigns in which African American activists, white religious leaders (of all faiths),
and two Presidents coalesced around a common religious narrative of collective sin and redemption.
Talk of the nation’s providential mission was everywhere during the mid-1960s, and the passage of not
one but two strong federal civil rights bills—a previously unthinkable development—meant there were
good reasons to believe that civil religious appeals were capable of motivating support for ambitious
national goals.
Needless to say, the picture would look very different by the middle of the following decade.
Writing in the aftermath of Watergate, Bellah lamented that the American civil religion had become “an
empty and broken shell” (Bellah 1975, p. 142). The problem was not simply that the nation’s political
leaders had betrayed the public trust; it was that average Americans now seemed to have little patience
for talk of quasi-religious national obligations, let alone of national sins. Hence, when Jimmy Carter
attempted, in his so-called “malaise” speech of 1979, to revive a “prophetic, judgmental version of
the American civil religion,” he was widely mocked (Hammond 1994, p. 3). Post-1960s Americans
much preferred being praised to being to judged, and the result was the rise of an ersatz civil religion
that transformed a once fallible nation into an object of uncritical veneration—a religion whose most
important prophet was Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan (Hammond 1994).
Bellah traced the root of the problem to “economic and technological advance[s]” that had exerted
a transformative impact on citizen character. By the 1970s, he wrote, America had become a society
of “mobile, competitive achievers” who were often unencumbered by the communal obligations of
“families and neighborhoods,” and who were largely ignorant of—and unconcerned with—the moral
traditions that had shaped the nation’s political development. In such a society, the signs and symbols
of the “external covenant” still made cameo appearances in political rhetoric, but there was little
chance that the they would be brought to life by the “internal covenant” whose existence presupposed
a morally engaged citizenry (Bellah 1975, p. 142). Perhaps reluctant to end on such a sour note,
Bellah, somewhat paradoxically, took heart from the fact that younger Americans seemed to be turning
away from traditional forms of organized religion. He observed that many young people viewed
the faith traditions in which they were raised as hopelessly compromised by their links to a corrupt
political and economic establishment, and he noted that several of the period’s fastest growing religious
movements—from the Hare Krishnas to the Jesus People—positioned themselves in opposition to
the dominant culture and its power structures, including the “technical” or “liberal utilitarian” forms
of reasoning on which these were based. Although no one could say what the future would bring,
these diverse movements, with their apocalyptic imagery, their “ethical criticism of society,” and their
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“insistence on the role of a remnant that already embodies the future,” at least offered a glimmer of hope
for those who longed for a “renewal” of the nation’s “religious imagination” (Bellah 1975, pp. 154–58).
The evidence examined above suggests a somewhat different explanation for the decline of
the American civil religion. If post-1960s Americans became suddenly less receptive to appeals
framed in the quasi-religious imagery of sin and redemption, it was at least in part because most
of the institutions that had traditionally allowed religious elites to influence the views of average
churchgoers were in disarray. The immediate problem was a sharp drop in mainline Protestant church
attendance (and giving) that began around 1960 and continued through the early 1970s. With the
churches starved for funds, the mainline institutional infrastructure began to wither. In the three-year
period beginning in 1965, more than 10 percent of the nation’s professional church councils were
disbanded. Between 1965 and 1971, the number of individuals employed by state and local councils
declined by more than 20 percent, and the number of volunteer church councils shrank by a third
(Compton Forthcoming; Association of Council Secretaries 1970). At the same time, the most important
Protestant ecumenical body, the National Council of Churches, began laying off dozens of staff members
and contemplating a variety of increasingly radical restructuring proposals (Thrapp 1970; Thrapp
1971; Thrapp 1972). Finally, as state and local church councils disbanded, and as the denominations
reduced their ecumenical involvement at the local level, politically liberal ministers were deprived
of a supportive network of like-minded peers, and the result may well have been to undercut their
enthusiasm for challenging the preexisting convictions of their parishioners (see e.g., Stark et al. 1970).
Bellah seems to have viewed these developments as more or less unconnected to the decline of the
American civil religion and the egalitarian reform agenda it had long supported. The ACR, he insisted,
operated largely outside of institutional channels; and, in any event, the “quasi-therapeutic blandness”
offered up by mainline religious elites seemed incapable of inspiring the sort of intense religious
devotion that had once given life to nation’s creedal commitments (Bellah 1975, p. 142; Bellah et al.
2008, p. 238). But if Bellah was right that the “internal covenant” that inspired popular devotion to the
ACR was never “completely captured by institutions,” he was wrong to discount the role of religious
institutions in making ACR appeals meaningful to average citizens. Indeed, in the years since Bellah
first lamented the decline of the American civic faith, it has become even more apparent that citizens
whose religious or ethical lives take place largely outside of formal religious institutions are unlikely to
be moved to action by religious themes and imagery. In an age of religious individualism, politicians
and public intellectuals may still sprinkle their speeches and writings with references to national
destiny, the founding covenant, or collective sin; the most gifted may even push these ideas in new and
innovative directions (Gorski 2017; Kloppenberg 2011). Rarely, however, will free-floating religious
appeals change the minds of citizens who were not already inclined to agree with the proposals on
offer. Absent a (highly unlikely) revival of formal religious authority and institution-building, the ACR
is therefore likely to remain a “broken shell.”
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